How much can the president do?
奥巴马总统在巴以关系中能发挥多大的作用？
Mar 19th 2013, 20:11 by S.M. | NEW YORK
ON THE eve of Barack Obama’s first trip to Israel as president, commentators are lobbing a lot of unsolicited advice his way. At the Washington Post, Jennifer Rubin recommends channeling George W. Bush, who affirmed the Jews’ biblical tie to the land and avoided all criticism of Israeli settlements in his 2008 speech to the Knesset. In a New York Times op-ed, from the opposite perspective, Rashid Khalidi insists that Mr Obama “must forthrightly oppose the occupation and the settlements and support an inalienable Palestinian right to freedom, equality and statehood.”
在奥巴马奔赴以色列开启他连任总统后的首次出访（注释1）之前，一些评论家对他这次“值不值得”访问提出很多的激辩。《华盛顿邮报》专栏作者珍妮弗•鲁宾（注释2）建议参照乔治•布什2008年在以色列议会演讲中提出的建议，即肯定以色列在该地区的宗教归属性，以及避免对以色列定居点的批判。而拉希德•卡里迪不支持这种观点，在《纽约时报》专栏报导中，他坚决认为奥巴马必须直截了当地反对以色列占领并定居（加沙地带）行为，支持巴勒斯坦人民享有自由，平等及国家独立的权利，这些权利是不可剥夺的。
The president is unlikely to tack in either direction. If his previous statements are any guide, he will steer a middle path: affirming the unshakable bond between America and Israel, affirming the rights of Israelis and Palestinians to live in peace and security, pressuring both sides to recognise the rights and interests of the other, and gamely encouraging the parties to return to the table for peace talks.
But such platitudes are unlikely to bear much fruit, as my colleague pointed out a few weeks ago, and all the advice is merely a projection of different perspectives on the conflict. Mr Khalidi came close to admitting the limited role the American president can expect to play when he wrote that “peace has to be made between Palestinians and Israelis, not between Mr Obama and his critics”, but he still framed the question as “what should Barack Obama…do about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?”
奥巴马不可能只走其中一条“路线”。如果推断他之前的讲话内容，可以看出他将会采取“中间路线”：强调美以两国牢不可破的关系，强调巴以两国人民有享有安定生活的权利，促使两国认可对方的权利及利益，鼓励两方重新进行和平谈话。我同事在几个星期之前指出这种陈词滥调不可能有太多的效果，所有的这些建议只不过是隐射奥巴马对巴以冲突问题的不同看法而已。当卡里迪写到：“巴以两国必须实现和平，而不仅仅是奥巴马和对其批判者之间的和平”，言外之意指美国总统希望能在巴以之间发挥有限的作用，但是卡里迪还是提出来了一个问题：奥巴马在巴以冲突中应该怎么做？
As we explained in last week’s paper, one thing Mr Obama can do is tell both sides that two states is the only solution. But the administration is dampening already low expectations. The president has said that his primary goal on his tour of Ramallah, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem is simply “to listen”. An adviser has stated that the president will focus on “the broader role of public opinion in peacemaking”. As the the Los Angeles Times reports, Mr Obama has some work to do making friends with the Israeli public:
就如我们在上周报道中所解释的，奥巴马能做的一件事是：告诉双方，唯一的解决办法就是两国方案。巴以对和平谈判已不抱太大希望，但是美国政府的做法更是火上浇油，奥巴马说，这次拉姆安拉市，特拉维夫市及耶路撒冷之行的主要目的仅仅是为了“倾听”。一位顾问称：奥巴马此行主要是讨论公众舆论在和平问题上发挥的更大作用。据《洛杉矶时报》报道，奥巴马得下些功夫才能和以色列民众称兄道弟。
A poll published Friday in the Maariv newspaper found that 38% of Israelis defined Obama’s attitude toward their country as “hostile” compared with 33% who found it “favorable.” More worrisome for Obama, only 10% of respondents said their opinion of the president was favorable, while the rest said their view was indifferent, unfavorable or even “hateful.” Other surveys have found more positive views, but Obama clearly does not enjoy the sort of demonstratively warm relationship with the Israeli public that his two predecessors had.
周五（以色列）《晚报》刊登的民意调查显示：38%的以色列人民认为奥巴马对以的采取敌对态度，而33%则觉得他的态度是友好的。让奥巴马更加郁闷的是，参与民意调查的人中，只有10%对奥巴马的评价不错，其他的人的态度则是冷淡，或是不喜欢，有人甚至讨厌。虽然其他的问卷调查显示出更多以色列人们对他的正面评价，但是，奥巴马明显没有像前两任总统那样享受这种与以色列人们之间的友好关系。
But charming average Israelis is at best a first, small step toward helping the two sides settle their differences. Even popular American presidents have had a very hard time brokering deals between Israelis and Palestinians. Just ask Bill Clinton, beloved by Israelis, who visited the region four times during his presidency, choreographed the historic handshake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat at the White House in 1993 and invested heart and soul into 14 days of Camp David talks in 2000. In his memoir, Mr Clinton summarised the final status agreement that wasn’t:
但是取悦每一个以色列人充其量是帮助巴以双方解决分歧的第一小步。可是受欢迎的美国总统们都难以帮助巴以两国达成一致协议。你可以问问深受以民喜欢的比尔•克林顿，他在就任总统期间四次出访以色列，1993年精心安排伊扎克•拉宾（注释3）与亚西尔•阿拉法特（注释4）的历史性会面，2000年全心投入历时14天的戴维营会谈（注释5）。克林顿在回忆录里总结这一最终没有达成协议的会谈：
I said these parameters were nonnegotiable and were the best I could do, and I wanted the parties to negotiate a final status agreement within them. After I left, Dennis Ross and other members of our team stayed behind to clarify any misunderstanding, but they refused to hear complaints. I knew the plan was tough for both parties, but it was time – past time – to put up or shut up. The Palestinians would give up the absolute right of return; they had always known they would have to, but they never wanted to admit it. The Israelis would give up East Jerusalem and parts of the Old City, but their religious and cultural sites would be preserved; it had been evident for some time that for peace to come, they would have to do that. The Israelis would also give up a little more of the West Bank and probably a larger land swap than Barak’s last best offer, but they would keep enough to hold at least 80 percent of the settlers. And they would get a formal end to the conflict. It was a hard deal, but if they wanted peace, I thought it was fair to both sides.
“我说，这些前提条件是不容商讨的，也是我能提供的最佳方案，我希望双方在此条件之内磋商并达成一个最终决议。我离开之后，丹尼斯•罗斯和其他成员留在那里澄清任何误解，但不愿倾听他们的抱怨。我知道双方都很难接受这个方案，但是时候做出最后的抉择了，不成功则成仁（其实时机早就过去了）。巴方必须放弃让以方归还全部土地的要求，他们早就知道必须放弃这一想法，但就是不愿承认。若以色列放弃东耶路撒冷及一部分部分耶路撒冷旧城，但是他们的宗教及文化遗址还是会保留下来，实现和平的时机已非常明显，他们必须去实现它。以色列也需要放弃约旦河西岸的一些土地，或许交换的土地要比巴拉克最后要求的还要多一些，但是他们能有足够的领土供80%以上的人居住。他们能正式的结束这一冲突。虽然这份协议很难达成，但如果他们都希望和平的话，我想这对双方都是公平的。
The big picture hasn’t changed much since 2000: the sticking points remain Jerusalem, land swaps and the Palestinian right of return. But some details make an agreement today even less likely. Binyamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas are constrained ideologically and practically in ways Mr Rabin and Mr Arafat were not: Bibi is no peacemaker, and the division of Palestinian leadership between Mr Abbas’s Fatah in the West Bank and the militant Hamas in Gaza makes it much harder for Mr Abbas to act. The number of Jewish settlers has more than doubled, multiplying facts on the ground and complicating any agreement on territory. Instability in Egypt, turmoil in Syria and the hostility of Iran pose immediate and near-term threats which overshadow the long-simmering, existential conundrum of the Palestinian question.
自2000年戴维营会谈结束后，巴以局势还是没有太大改观：症结仍然是耶路撒冷的归属，土地交换以及巴勒斯坦要求以方归还土地问题。但是现在双方已不太可能在一些细节问题上达成协议了。本亚明•内塔尼亚胡和穆罕默德•阿巴斯都受到意识形态以及现实状况的约束，而拉宾与阿拉法特没有受到这种约束的影响：《圣经》不是和事佬，巴勒斯坦领导层的两派纷争（阿巴斯在西约旦河的法塔赫势力与加沙地带的哈马斯（注释6）军事力量）让阿巴斯的和谈计划难上加难。犹太定居者的数量增加了一倍多，使得两国就领土达成协议复杂化。当前埃及社会不稳定，叙利亚局势动荡，伊朗的敌视态度对世界构成直接和暂时性威胁，这也冲淡了长期以来存在的巴勒斯坦问题。
注释1: 这是奥巴马就任总统以来首次访问以色列，也是他连任以来的首次出访。奥巴马只在2008年以总统竞选人的身份造访过该国。
注释2：珍妮弗•鲁宾（Jennifer Rubin）是《华盛顿邮报》博客作者，新保守主义作家珍妮弗•鲁宾在《华盛顿邮报》上的博客“向右转”（Right Turn）既有报道又有评论，她经常触及外交政策问题，只要博客上一有的新内容似乎就能成为新闻。在《评论》杂志上发表了引发热议的《犹太人为什么憎恨萨拉•佩林》等文章后，鲁宾的名字总是伴随着争议。
注释3：伊扎克•拉宾：以色列政治家、军事家。1974年至1977年出任以色列总理；1992年起再次出任总理，直至1995年被刺身亡。他是首位出生于以色列本土的总理，首位被刺杀和第二位在任期间辞世的总理。1994年10月14日，阿拉法特、佩雷斯、拉宾分享诺贝尔和平奖。
注释4：亚西尔•阿拉法特（1929年8月27日—2004年11月11日），全名拉赫曼•阿卜杜勒•拉乌夫•阿拉法特•古德瓦•侯赛尼，毕生致力于争取恢复巴勒斯坦人民合法民族权利的正义事业。1989年，当选巴勒斯坦国总统。自1993年起是巴勒斯坦当局的领导人、自1969年起任巴解组织主席及巴解组织最大派别法塔赫的领导人，1996年，巴勒斯坦民族权力机构成立后，阿拉法特任主席，是1994年诺贝尔和平奖的获得者之一。病逝于2004年，享年75岁。
注释5：戴维营会谈：美国，以色列和巴勒斯坦三国就巴以冲突进行的秘密会谈，历时21天。
注释6：哈马斯：由“伊斯兰”、 “抵抗”、“运动” 三个阿拉伯语缩写而成。哈马斯成立于1987年12月，创始人为谢赫•艾哈迈德•亚辛。集宗教性、政治性为一体的哈马斯主张用武力消灭巴土地上的犹太复国主义者，反对同以色列和平共处，主张建立一个以耶路撒冷为首都的独立的巴勒斯坦国。哈马斯拥有正式成员２万多人及下属军事组织。